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Abstract—We consider the problem of securely conducting
a poll in synchronous dynamic networks equipped with
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Whereas previous dis-
tributed solutions had a communication cost of O(n2) in
an n nodes system, we present SPP (Secure and Private
Polling), the ﬁrst distributed polling protocol requiring only
a communication complexity of O(n log3 n), which we prove
is near-optimal. Our protocol ensures perfect security against
a computationally-bounded adversary, tolerates ( 1
2
− )n
Byzantine nodes for any constant 1
2
>  > 0 (not depending
on n), and outputs the exact value of the poll with high
probability. SPP is composed of two sub-protocols, which
we believe to be interesting on their own: SPP-Overlay
maintains a structured overlay when nodes leave or join
the network, and SPP-Computation conducts the actual
poll. We validate the practicality of our approach through
experimental evaluations and describe brieﬂy two possible
applications of SPP: (1) an optimal Byzantine Agreement
protocol whose communication complexity is Θ(n log n) and
(2) a protocol solving an open question of King and Saia
in the context of aggregation functions, namely on the
feasibility of performing multiparty secure aggregations with
a communication complexity of o(n2).
I. INTRODUCTION
We deﬁne the Polling problem as the one of providing to
all the users the result of a poll that is conducted among
themselves, thus yielding the number of votes for each
candidate. This is an essential functionality of distributed
systems that deal with the computation of global functions
out of the local values held by the nodes. For instance,
polling includes the problem of agreement (as deﬁned
in [1]) as a speciﬁc case. In general, polling can also
be extended to compute any global function that is a
linear combination of the local inputs. Such functions are
particularly important in large-scale systems in which they
are typically used to compute global properties of systems
(e.g., for monitoring purposes). While such computations
may be achieved through a trusted central entity gathering
all local inputs [2], distributed variants are appealing for
scalability and privacy reasons.
In this paper, we address simultaneously three funda-
mental issues related to the distributed implementation of a
polling in a dynamic network: namely correctness, privacy
and scalability. The computation of a polling function is
a speciﬁc instance of the much broader problem of secure
multiparty computation. Therefore, generic constructions
from this domain can be used [3], [4] to solve the problem
while tolerating up to n/2− 1 Byzantine (i.e., malicious)
nodes, where n is the number of nodes of the system.
However, these constructions are often expensive with a
global communication cost that is quadratic in n [5]. In
addition, most of them assume the existence of a broadcast
channel, which is rarely available in large scale networks.
Simulating such a channel deterministically is possible but
has a communication cost of Ω(n2) [6], [7].
The main motivation of this work is to design a dis-
tributed polling protocol whose communication complex-
ity is close to be linear in the number of nodes of the
system. This is impossible to achieve with certainty (i.e.,
through a deterministic algorithm) in a secure manner by
the following argument: to be certain that a message sent
by a node is not altered by a collusion of m Byzantine
nodes, it needs to be sent at least m + 1 times (since all
Byzantine nodes could simply drop the message), which
induces O(nm) = O(n2) messages when m = O(n).
Therefore, instead of seeking to design a deterministic
algorithm achieving correctness with certainty, we investi-
gate probabilistic algorithms outputting the exact value of
the polling with high probability.
Our ﬁrst contribution (Section III) is to prove a lower
bound stating that at least Ω(n log n) messages are re-
quired to compute any multiparty function (not only
polling) in an accurate way with high probability. This
lower bound holds whenever the adversary controls a
constant fraction of the nodes. The lower bound proof
leverages on the strategy consisting of the adversary
controlling all the neighbors through which a speciﬁc node
transmits its vote while honest nodes select the nodes that
will receive their inputs at random to make it difﬁcult for
the adversary to control them all.
Our second and main contribution (Section IV) is SPP
(Secure and Private Polling), a near-optimal distributed
polling protocol protecting the privacy of individual inputs
and tolerating up to ( 12 − )n Byzantine nodes, for any
constant 12 >  > 0 independent of n. SPP is designed
for dynamic networks and precisely leverages the churn
induced by such a network (i.e., when nodes leave and
join the system) to maintain an overlay that can be used
to compute any polling function. SPP outputs the exact
outcome of the poll with high probability as n tends to
inﬁnity, has a global communication cost of O(n log3 n)
bits, and is balanced. In a nutshell, SPP is composed of two
sub-protocols. SPP-Overlay is a novel distributed version
of the protocol presented in [8] that builds and maintains
an overlay of clusters of size O(log n), such that each
cluster contains a majority of honest nodes. The construc-
tion of such an overlay is a necessary condition to ensure
the correctness of SPP. SPP-Computation relies on this
overlay to conduct the poll, using existing cryptographic
techniques [9] within clusters, which would otherwise be
too expensive to run at the level of the entire network.
Although we partially beneﬁt from existing techniques in
distributed systems and cryptography, to the best of our
knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to adapt and to reunite all of
them in a dynamic distributed system to obtain a scalable
and secure solution to polling.
We further describe two possible applications of SPP
(Section V). First, we demonstrate how it can be adapted
to give a positive answer to an open question by King
and Saia [10] in the context of functions that consist in a
linear combination of inputs. Namely, we show that it is
possible to compute this type of functions in a dynamic
network with a communication complexity of o(n2) bits,
even in the presence of an adversary controlling a constant
fraction of the nodes. Second, we propose an optimal
Byzantine agreement protocol, with a complexity lower
than the state-of-the-art lower bound of n1/3 proved in
the context of static networks [11]. This lower bound
is circumvented by considering the context of dynamic
networks, where it is possible that nodes join or leave. In
that case, we beneﬁt from our distributed construction of
the nodes’ overlay structure, which is further maintained
dynamically.
Finally, we experimentally evaluate our approach
through the implementation of a distributed polling proto-
col and of an agreement protocol on the Emulab testbed
[12] (Section VI).
II. MODEL AND RELATED WORK
A. Related Work
1) Dynamic Overlays: Overlay networks organize
nodes of a distributed system in a logical structure in
order to allow efﬁcient communications and to minimize
the memory overhead. In this work, we are primarily
interested in dynamic overlays tolerating the presence of
Byzantine nodes controlled by an adversary. For instance,
an early work of Scheideler [13] aims at partitioning the
the nodes into clusters, each with a majority of honest
nodes. Scheideler achieves this property by using a trusted
central authority and introducing the concept of k-rotation,
which organizes nodes along a ring so that any set of
consecutive O(log n) nodes has an honest majority. In
a followup work by Awerbuch and Scheideler [14], the
cuckoo rule was introduced, allowing to maintain this
property even when the Byzantine nodes can leave and
rejoin the system at their convenience. Since our own
approach is inspired by this work, thereafter we summarize
the system and adversary models that are also the ones we
adopt in this paper. The system considered by Awerbuch
and Scheideler is composed of n nodes, among which
a constant fraction (less than 1/2 −  for some constant
 > 0) is controlled by an active, static adversary choosing
the nodes it wants to corrupt at the time at which they join
the network [15]. The nodes controlled by the adversary
are called Byzantine and can behave arbitrarily, for in-
stance by deviating from the protocol speciﬁcation. The
adversary has a complete knowledge of the system while
honest nodes only have a local knowledge. Furthermore,
the network is dynamic: at each time step and for a poly-
nomial number of rounds, the adversary can choose any of
the nodes it controls to make it perform a join-leave attack
(i.e., to make it leave and rejoin the system). However, the
number honest nodes changes within a constant factor over
time. In this setting, the cuckoo rule enables to organize
the nodes along a ring of length one, so that any segment
of length O(log n/n) contains O(log n) nodes, among
which a majority are honest with high probability (i.e.
with probability at least 1−1/n). The validity of this rule
was proved under a polylogarithmic number of leave-join
attacks. To simplify their proofs, the authors use the extra
assumption that at initialization, the system is exclusively
composed of honest nodes. Later, this work was extended
by the cuckoo & ﬂip rule [16], which provides resilience
against Denial-Of-Service (DOS) attacks at the expense
of reducing the fraction of Byzantine nodes that can be
tolerated to τ < 15 − .
Other types of adversaries have also been considered
in the literature. For instance, the Chameleon system [17],
which assumes an adversary capable of blocking a fraction
of nodes, uses a randomized replication scheme to protect
distributed servers against DOS attacks. SHELL [18], also
due to Scheideler, is a dynamic distributed system resistant
to Sybil attacks that is particularly tailored for hetero-
geneous systems. Finally, defense mechanisms working
against an adversary that can lead nodes to crash were
also considered [19]. In that work, the authors propose
a distributed protocol to maintain an overlay when the
number of crashes and joins is of the order of the max-
imum degree of the network, which they prove as being
optimal. However, unlike our work, they assume that all
nodes follow the protocol and that the adversary is fail-
stop.
2) Secure Multiparty Computation: The main objective
of secure multiparty computation is to allow participants
to compute, in a distributed manner, a joint function over
their inputs while at the same time protecting the privacy
of these inputs and ensuring the correctness of the output.
This problem was ﬁrst introduced in the bipartite setting
by Yao in 1982 [20] and has since become one of the most
active ﬁelds of cryptography. Since the seminal paper of
Yao, generic constructions have been developed for the
multiparty setting, and a dichotomy appears depending on
the proportion of nodes controlled by the adversary. On
one hand, as long as the number of Byzantine nodes is
strictly less than n/2, it is possible to securely compute
(in the cryptographic sense) any distributed function [3].
If one requires unconditional security (in the information-
theoretic sense), then the number of Byzantine nodes
should be limited to n/3 [4], [21] unless a broadcast
channel is available [22], [23], [24]. If the broadcast
channel is not available as a resource, the bound of
n/2 still applies. For some distributed functions, these
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protocols were proven to be optimal with respect to the
number of Byzantine nodes that can be tolerated [25], [26].
On the other hand, it is still possible to ensure some
security guarantees when there is a majority of Byzantine
nodes. For instance in [26], the authors have shown that
the only functions that can be securely computed when a
majority of nodes are Byzantine (up to n − 1) are those
that consist in a XOR-combination of n Boolean inputs.
Nevertheless, a weaker notion of security can always be
fulﬁlled when there is a majority of Byzantine nodes. This
notion still provides privacy and correctness, yet it allows
some nodes to abort the protocol while others obtain the
(correct) output (thus sacriﬁcing the robustness property).
Protocols guaranteeing this notion of security for any
number of corrupted parties can be constructed based on
cryptographic assumptions [27], [3], [28]. Recent work has
been dedicated to protocols achieving full security with
an adversarial minority and the weaker notion of security
with adversarial majority (see for instance [29] for some
impossibility results as well as some positive ones).
In [2], a polling protocol (a speciﬁc case of secure
multiparty computation) was proposed that computes the
outcome of an electronic election while providing cryp-
tographic security for a global communication cost of
O(n). However, contrary to our approach, this protocol
requires the availability of a trusted entity during the whole
computation. Our work is also to be compared to [30], in
which the authors propose a protocol computing a
√
n-
approximation of an aggregation function (i.e. functions
that output a linear combination of the inputs). This is
achieved even in the presence of
√
n/ log n rational adver-
sarial nodes (a weaker form of adversary than Byzantine
nodes), with a global communication cost of O(n3/2) and
without relying on cryptographic assumptions. Finally, in
[10], an open question was asked on whether secure multi-
party computation can be achieved with a communication
complexity of o(n2). In our work, we positively answer
this question in the context of functions that output a linear
combination of the inputs.
3) Byzantine Agreement: The problem of Byzantine
Agreement (BA) was introduced originally by Lamport et
al. [1] and consists in having all the honest nodes agreeing
on a bit value among the input bits initially proposed by
them. Clearly, this problem can be solved by running an
election protocol between two candidates (named 0 and
1). Running a secure multiparty computation would give
even more privacy guarantees as it also ensures that the
adversary does not learn any additional information about
the inputs of honest nodes. A lower bound of Ω˜(n1/3)
was proved in the context of static networks. However,
this lower bound does not hold in the dynamic case as
shown by our work.
The most efﬁcient BA protocols that can be found
in the literature are probabilistic and have a communi-
cation complexity of O˜(n3/2) [31]. More precisely, the
protocols proposed in [32] and [31] have sub-quadratic
communication complexity against a Byzantine adversary
controlling less than n/(6 + ) (for some constant  > 0)
and n/3 nodes respectively, in the full information model.
However, these protocols assume that all nodes know the
identities of all the other nodes in the system, which
in itself hides an Ω(n2) communication complexity to
propagate this information.
4) Homomorphic encryption: In our work, we rely
on a cryptographic primitive known as homomorphic
encryption. This primitive allows to perform arithmetic
operations (such as addition and/or multiplication) on
encrypted values, thus protecting the privacy of the inputs
of honest nodes. Paillier’s cryptosystem [33] is an instance
of a homomorphic encryption scheme. This cryptosystem
is also semantically secure [15], which means that a
computationally-bounded adversary cannot derive non-
trivial information about the plain text m encrypted from
the cipher text Enc(m) and the public key pk. In this paper,
we use a threshold version of the Paillier’s cryptosystem
[9]. In this version, all nodes get the same public key, with
which they can encrypt messages. However, each node
gets a share of the private key and uses it to produce a
share of the decrypted output. Only upon receiving t− 1
other shares can a node compute the decrypted output.
B. Model
1) System and Adversary: We use the system and
adversarial model of [8], [34] as summarized in Section
II-A). Notice, however, that the assumption that, at the
beginning, all the nodes are honest is only used to apply
the results proved in [8], [34]. We do not need it for any
other reason in this work. In particular, the initialization
of the overlay works in the presence of the adversary.
2) Key Management: We assume that each node gets
assigned a pair of private/public keys for digital signatures
by a (trusted) Certiﬁcation Authority (CA), which there-
fore corresponds to a form of Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). When a node joins the network, it receives its
private key as well as a certiﬁcate signed by the CA
containing its corresponding public key. The public key
is assumed to be unique and chosen at random and thus
can be considered as the node identiﬁer. Note that this
CA is dedicated to key management and is not used
for any other task. Some decentralized implementations
of such a CA are possible, but they are out of the
scope of this paper. Moreover, these keys are different
from those of the threshold cryptosystem detailed later in
Section IV-D2. We also assume that all nodes in the system
communicate via pairwise secure channels, which means
that all the communications exchanged between two nodes
are authenticated and conﬁdential from the point of view
of an external eavesdropper.
3) Network and Communication: Our protocols work
in the synchronous model in which the communications
between nodes proceed in rounds. We assume that a node
can communicate with any other node as long as the
identiﬁer is known to it. We do not assume that the
nodes know the identities of all the other nodes in the
system, except during the initialization phase (Section
IV-C). In particular, once the initialization phase has been
completed, each node will only need to have a local
knowledge of a polylogarithmic number of other nodes in
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the system (the set of nodes a particular node knows varies
as the protocol proceeds but the size of this set always
remains bounded). Notice that ensuring full knowledge
whenever a node joins the system would have a message
complexity of n, which is not scalable as we consider a
polynomial number of leave-join operations.
4) Polling Computation: Occasionally, the nodes
within the system conduct a poll in a distributed
manner. This poll is performed on the individual in-
puts (x1, . . . , xn) of the nodes, in which xi is taken
from a set of  different possible candidates (i.e.,
xi ∈ L = {ν1, . . . , ν}). The poll result allows each
node to know the number of votes received by each
candidate. We restrict ourselves to the polling problem for
ease of presentation, but our protocol can be extended to
evaluate any property of the network that can be obtained
by a linear combination of the local inputs. Examples
of such functions include the byzantine agreement and
the computation of the average (or the sum) of inputs
(i.e., f(x1, . . . , xn) = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi). While our protocol
maintains an overlay under churn, we assume that the
network remains static during the computation of the
polling function. Therefore, any join operation occurring
during such a computation is postponed to the end of the
protocol.
Due to the presence of Byzantine nodes, the com-
putation needs to be achieved in a secure way, in the
sense that it should offer some guarantees on the privacy
(Deﬁnition 1) of local inputs of honest nodes and on the
correctness of the output (Deﬁnition 2), and this against
any actions that the adversary might do.
Deﬁnition 1 (Privacy [15]). A distributed protocol is said
to be private with respect to an adversary controlling a
fraction τ of nodes if this adversary cannot learn (except
with negligible probability) more information from the
execution of the protocol than it could from its own input
(i.e., the inputs of the Byzantine nodes it controls) and the
output of the protocol.
In this work, we want to achieve privacy against a
computationally-bounded adversary that coordinates the
Byzantines nodes but does not have enough computing
resources to break a cryptographic assumption on which
the techniques are based (such as factorizing the product
of two big prime numbers or solving the discrete logarithm
problem). Furthermore, we aim at ensuring correctness
(Deﬁnition 2), even if the Byzantine nodes controlled by
the adversary misbehave.
Deﬁnition 2 (Correctness). A distributed protocol is said
to be correct with respect to an adversary controlling a
fraction τ of the nodes if the output of the protocol is
guaranteed to be exact with high probability.
Moreover, we are looking for scalable protocols, with
low computational complexity, and with a global com-
munication cost as close as possible to the lower bound
Ω(n log n) that we prove in Section III. In addition, we
also aim at achieving a balanced protocol (Deﬁnition 3),
in which each node receives and sends approximately the
same quantity of information.
Deﬁnition 3 ((Cin, Cout)-balanced). A distributed proto-
col among n nodes whose communication complexity is
Ctotal is said to be (Cin, Cout)-balanced, if each node
sends O(CinCtotal/n) and receives O(CoutCtotal/n) bits
of information where Ctotal is the total number of bits sent
by all the nodes.
For instance, in a (1, 1)-balanced protocol, each node
sends and receives the same number of bits (up to
a constant factor) whereas, in an (n, n)-balanced pro-
tocol, a single node could do all the work. In this
work, we will say that a protocol is balanced if it is
(Poly(log n), Poly(log n))-balanced.
III. LOWER BOUND ON SECURE MULTIPARTY
COMPUTATION
In this section, we show that no balanced algorithm
(with respect to Deﬁnition 3) can compute a polling func-
tion with a global communication complexity of o(n log n)
provided that the number of Byzantine nodes is linear in
the number of nodes in the system. The lower bound is
obtained as a corollary of the following theorem and ap-
plies regardless of the privacy guarantees that the protocol
seeks to achieve.
Theorem 1 (Lower bound on secure multiparty compu-
tation). Consider a distributed protocol that computes a
function whose inputs are held by n nodes, among which
n are Byzantine for some positive constant 0 <  < 1
(independent of n). Suppose that a fraction cn of the
nodes sends no more than ω+(n) messages (for some
ω+(n) = o(log n) and constant 1 > c > 0). Assume
further that no node receives more than ω−(n) messages
(with ω+(n)eω
+(n)ω−(n) = o(n)). These conditions im-
ply that, with high probability (in n), there is a node whose
messages are all intercepted by Byzantine nodes.
Proof: We refer the reader to the long version of this
paper [35] for the details of the proof.
Corollary 1. Consider a (Poly(log n), n)-balanced pro-
tocol computing with high probability the exact value of
a function in a distributed manner, such that its inputs
are held by n nodes among which n are Byzantine (for
some positive constant  < 1 independent of n). Then this
protocol induces a total of Ω(n log n) messages.
IV. SECURE AND PRIVATE POLLING (SPP)
A. SPP in a nutshell
We now provide a high-level view of our SPP (Secure
and Private Polling) protocol that performs a poll in a
decentralized setting (see also Figure 1). SPP relies on
SPP-Overlay, a distributed version of the protocol in [8],
described in Section IV-B. SPP-Overlay organizes the n
nodes into g clusters, C0, . . . , Ci . . . , Cg−1, of roughly the
same size. The clusters are further arranged into both a
Chord overlay [36] and a binary tree overlay. SPP-Overlay
assumes that a threshold homomorphic cryptosystem [9]
has been set up and that each node knows the public key
pk and its share ski of the secret key of the threshold
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cryptosystem. This is ensured by a precomputation phase
detailed later.
SPP-Computation proceeds as follows:
1) After making its choice, each node does a preprocessing
step (described below), transforming this choice into an
input value that can be added with others. It then encrypts
this new input using pk and securely broadcasts it within
its cluster. Secure broadcast ensures that (1) all honest
nodes receive an identical message, regardless of the ac-
tions of the sender and the Byzantine nodes (consistency),
and (2) this output is the message of the sender, provided
it is honest (validity) [7]. Hereafter, we will be using the
secure broadcast protocol of Dolev and Reischuk [7] to
emulate the broadcast channel.
2) The nodes in a given cluster agree in a distributed
and secure manner on a common random string rand,
which is the randomness injected into the homomorphic
encryption (we refer the interested reader to [15], [9] for
further details). Afterwards, each node adds the encrypted
inputs it received from its own cluster using the addition
operation of the homomorphic cryptosystem. The result of
this addition is called the local aggregate and is the same
for each honest node of the cluster.
3) Starting from the clusters at the leaves of the binary tree,
the nodes of these clusters send their local aggregates to all
the nodes of their parent clusters. The nodes of the latter
add their own local aggregate with the two received ones
from their children, thus forming the partial aggregate.
A partial aggregate is adopted from the child cluster if
and only if the same message was sent by a majority
of nodes from this cluster. This majority decision rule
is used to discard inconsistent messages that have been
sent by Byzantine nodes. The partial aggregates are then
propagated towards the root, by repeating this process
O(log n) times. When the partial aggregates reach C0,
we say that the partial aggregate has become the global
aggregate.
4) The nodes of the root cluster perform a threshold de-
cryption of the global aggregate, thus revealing the output
of the protocol, which is propagated down throughout
the binary tree. Each node then processes the output (as
described later) to discover the polling result.
B. SPP-Overlay
For the purpose of our polling protocol, nodes in SPP
are organized into clusters C0, . . . , Cg−1, each of size
O(log n). To achieve this, we assume that the nodes
join the network according to a distributed version of
the protocol presented in [8], where the original protocol
relied on a trusted central authority (CA). Before showing
how to avoid the CA, we ﬁrst describe its functionality.
Each node is assigned by the CA a random position on
the segment [0, 1). By inducing artiﬁcial churn when a
node joins the system, the protocol of [8] is proven to
ensure that each segment of size c log(n)/n, for some
speciﬁc constant c, contains a majority of honest nodes,
under the condition that the adversary controls at most a
fraction of 12 −  of Byzantine nodes, for some constant
1
2 >  > 0, independent of n. The clusters C0, . . . , Cg−1
a3
a2
a1
A
b1
b2
b3
B
c3
c2
c1
C B C
A
∑
bi
∑
ci
∑
ai
C
A
B
∑
bi
∑
ci
∑
ai +
∑
bi +
∑
ci
∑
bi
∑
ci
Fig. 1. Main idea of the algorithm. First, all nodes start by encrypting
their inputs and broadcasting them to all the other nodes of the cluster.
Within each cluster, each node computes the local aggregate (
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ci), which is then propagated along the binary tree. After this,
the nodes of cluster A know
∑
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∑
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ci. The nodes of the
last cluster (here A) collaborate to perform the threshold decryption and
to output the polling result.
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C4
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Fig. 2. Chord overlay.
are composed of the nodes whose positions are in the
respective segments [0, c log n/n), . . . , [1− c log n/n, 1).
In order to design an efﬁcient distributed version of SPP,
we ﬁrst arrange the clusters in a Chord-like overlay [36].
The adapted join-leave protocol must further ensure that,
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ g − 1, the nodes from cluster Ci know all
the nodes from C(i+2j−1) mod g , for all 1 ≤ j ≤ log2 g,
which results in O(log2 n) connections per node (see
Figure 2). Along with this Chord overlay, we consider
a binary tree of depth O(log n) connecting the nodes of
each cluster Ci to those of C2i+1 (for 2i+1 < g−1) and
C2i+2 (for 2i+ 2 < g − 1).
In [8] the authors assume that initially the network is
composed of only honest nodes; instead, we propose a
bootstrapping technique for the construction of the overlay
in Section IV-C. We now describe how to adapt the join
rule, called cuckoo rule [8] and how to maintain the
overlay in a decentralized way. The leave rule of [16],
which is required when the adversary can force any node
to leave the network (for instance through a DOS attack),
can be adapted similarly (the full details of this adaptation
can be found in the long version of this paper [35]).
More precisely, we rely on two following subroutines to
distribute the cuckoo rule.
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1) Inter-cluster communication. A node of cluster C
receiving a message from a node of cluster C ′ accepts it
if and only if C ′ is a neighbor of C in the Chord overlay
or in the binary tree, and at least half of the nodes of C ′
have sent the same message.
2) Random number generation (RNG). This primitive
is used to generate a number at random within some
predeﬁned range (typically between 0 and logd n for
some constant d). For fault-tolerant distributed random
generation, notice that adding any set of numbers in a
ﬁnite ﬁeld F outputs a value taken uniformly at random as
long as at least one element of this set is chosen uniformly
at random, independently from the others. Hence, if each
node commits to a random number without knowing what
the other nodes have selected, the sum of these committed
values is truly random if at least one of them is so. For
this, we rely on the Veriﬁable Secret Sharing (VSS) notion
introduced in [37]. In its distributed version, t-tolerant
VSS allows a certain party (called the dealer) to spread
shares of a secret s among m parties such that no collusion
of t or less nodes can (1) infer any information about s or
(2) prevent the reconstruction of s out of the shares. VSS
has two phases: sharing and reconstruction. In the sharing
phase, the nodes exchange messages in order to spread
the dealer’s shares. Next, in the reconstruction phase, the
shares are combined by the nodes to either (1) recover the
same secret s or (2) tag the dealer as cheater. In this work,
we use the (n − 1)/2-tolerant probabilistic VSS protocol
of [38]. Accordingly, the RNG protocol in a set S of nodes
proceeds as follows: (1) each node i in S chooses a random
number ri ∈ F. (2) Each node i acts as a dealer and
shares ri using the VSS protocol. (3) For each node i, the
reconstruction phase of the VSS protocol is triggered to
recover ri. If reconstruction fails, the zero element in F is
used. (4) Each node i calculates the sum in F r =
∑
j
rj .
We now explain how the cuckoo rule (i.e., join rule)
is modiﬁed in order to avoid a CA. We assume that a
node x joining the network is able to contact one of
the nodes of the network which gives it the identity and
composition of an arbitrary cluster (this cluster is chosen
among the clusters that the contacted node knows). In turn,
x contacts the whole cluster (i.e., all its members) with a
join request. Afterwards, this cluster starts to perform the
cuckoo rule from [8], which corresponds to choosing a
position p at random in [0, 1) for x. The nodes of the
unique cluster containing p, to which we refer as C, are
informed via messages routed using the Chord overlay that
x is inserted at position p. At this point, extra churn is
induced: for a constant k > 1 , C chooses a new random
position for all the nodes of C whose positions are in
a segment of length k/n containing p (see [8] for more
details). Whenever a node x of a cluster C ′ is required
to change its position to join a cluster C”, all the nodes
that were adjacent or become adjacent to this node, are
informed of the change by messages sent by the nodes of
C ′ and C” respectively. This step is crucial since all the
nodes of a cluster C adjacent to C ′ in the Chord overlay or
in the binary tree have to know the exact composition of
C ′ in order to decide whether or not to accept a message
from nodes of C ′ during inter-cluster communication.
With high probability, the communication overhead of the
distributed version of this protocol is O(log3 n) per join
operation: for each node to be moved, the overhead can be
proved to be O(log3n) for the random number generation
and O(logn)×O(log2n) for propagating the information
using the Chord overlay. Moreover, the expected number
of nodes in a segment of size k/n is O(k); thus the
protocol needs to move a constant number of nodes with
high probability. This protocol ensures that each cluster
contains Ω(log n) nodes, among which there is a majority
of honest nodes as long as τ the fraction of Byzantine
nodes is less that 1/2− .
C. Initialization Phase
In [8], [13], [16], [34], the proofs are done assuming that
initially the network is exclusively composed of honest
nodes. However, we do not use this hypothesis to bootstrap
our protocol as we explain below.
In [10], the authors proposed a protocol for a fully
connected network composed of at least 1/2+ fraction of
honest nodes, which ensures that all honest nodes agree on
a small representative set C of nodes containing a majority
of honest nodes with high probability. The communication
cost of this algorithm is O˜(n3/2). Once selected, this rep-
resentative set can compute a random partition of the nodes
into g = O(n/ log n) sets of equal size {C0, . . . , Cg−1},
which are organized into a Chord overlay and a binary
tree. This partitioning method has a communication cost
of O˜(n3/2) due to the use of the BA protocol. In addition,
it incurs (1) a cost of O˜(n) for the representative set to
agree on the partition and (2) a cost of O˜(n) to propagate
the partition (i.e., by having the nodes of C sending to
each node x the composition of its cluster (Ci such that
x ∈ Ci) and the composition of its neighboring clusters.
Overall, this results in a global communication cost of
O˜(n3/2) for the initialization phase (note that this phase
is performed only once at the construction of the overlay).
D. SPP-Computation
In this section, we present the second phase of the
SPP protocol during which the polling result is effectively
computed. This protocol (1) is optimal up to a logarithmic
factor in terms of scalability (i.e., communication and
computational complexity), (2) has a round complexity of
O(log n), (3) achieves perfect security (i.e., privacy and
correctness) against a computationally-bounded adversary
controlling at most (1/2 − )n Byzantine nodes, for a
constant 12 >  > 0 independent of n, and (4) is balanced.
1) Input pre-processing: We assume that each node
of the network knows the following public parameters: 
(number of possible choices), L (list of possible choices),
and s (taken as the length of the RSA modulus in the
cryptosystem used). Choices are numbered from 0 to
 − 1. We aim at mapping these choices to input values
of an aggregation protocol and to be able to retrieve,
from the aggregate, the number of votes for each choice.
One way to do so is mapping choice i to the input
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value 2ib, where b = s/. Any input outside the set
M = {1 . . . 2ib . . . 2(l−1)b} for i ∈ {0 . . . l − 1} is
considered invalid.
2) Setting up the threshold cryptosystem: C0 (that we
refer thereafter as the threshold cluster) is in charge of
setting up the threshold cryptosystem. This set-up phase
requires all nodes of the threshold cluster to engage in
a distributed key generation protocol [39] for a threshold
homomorphic cryptosystem [9]. At the end of this key
generation phase, all the nodes of the threshold cluster
receive the same public key pk and each gets a share
of the private secret key (sk1, . . . , skk logn). The thresh-
old cryptosystem is such that any node can encrypt a
value using the public key pk but that the decryption of
a homomorphically encrypted value requires the active
cooperation of at least t of the nodes. In our case, the
parameter t is set to be at least k logn2 to ensure that
there will be enough honest nodes to cooperate for the
ﬁnal decryption of the result at the end of the protocol.
The public key pk is then communicated in the network
cluster by cluster by following the structure of the binary
tree. Thereafter, when we say that a cluster communicates
a value to the next cluster, we mean that at least all the
honest nodes in the current cluster communicate the same
value to all the nodes in the next cluster using inter-
cluster communication, which results in a communication
cost of O(log2 n). Once the previous round is over, the
node decides, via a majority rule, on the ﬁnal value for
this particular round of inter-cluster communication. This
value always corresponds to the unique value sent by all
the honest nodes of the previous cluster, which are by
construction a majority within this cluster (cf. inter-cluster
communication).
3) Local aggregation: Each node within a cluster com-
municates its input encrypted using the public key pk to
all the other nodes of its cluster through a secure broadcast
channel along with a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
that this input is valid [40]. The complexity of constructing
such a channel is polynomial in the number of nodes of
the cluster, which is here O(log2 n) and can be obtained
for instance by running the broadcast protocol proposed
by Dolev and Reischuk [7]. The main objective of the
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is to prevent an
adversary from tampering with the output of the protocol
by providing an invalid input. The privacy of the inputs is
preserved by the semantic property of the cryptosystem [9]
that we use. Once all nodes of the cluster have received
the encrypted inputs from the other members, they add
them using the additive property of the homomorphic
cryptosystem. With respect to the randomness used in the
addition operation of the homomorphic encryption, we
assume that all the nodes have agreed on a common value
rand.
4) Global aggregation and threshold decryption: The
global protocol proceeds iteratively during O(log n) iter-
ations. The nodes from leaf clusters in the binary tree
send their local aggregate to their parent cluster. When
a node receives the aggregate from the nodes of both
of its child clusters, it adds its local aggregate and the
two received ones, which gives a partial aggregate. This
partial aggregate corresponds to the aggregation of the
inputs of the nodes in the clusters in the subtree rooted
at the current cluster; this aggregate is further transmitted
to the nodes of the parent cluster. As mentioned previously,
the encrypted value received from the previous cluster can
be decided on by each node of the current cluster using
a majority rule on the O(log n) messages received from
the previous cluster. Once the threshold cluster has been
reached (e.g., the root of the binary tree), the members of
this cluster add their local aggregated values to the partial
aggregates received from the two children, producing an
encryption of the sum of all the values. Finally, the
members of the threshold cluster cooperate to decrypt
this global aggregate by using their private key shares.
Along with their decryption shares, the nodes send a non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof showing that they have
computed a valid decryption share of the ﬁnal outcome [9].
As the number of nodes needed to decrypt successfully is
t = k logn2 and that there is a majority of honest nodes in
the cluster, this threshold decryption is guaranteed to be
successful. The ﬁnal output is forwarded cluster by cluster,
following the binary tree structure of the overlay.
5) Output post-processing: Given the decryption result
r, each node can know the number of voters for choice i
by calculating (r mod 2b(i+1))2ib, except for i = l−1,
whose number of voters is r/2i(l−1). To see why this
works, notice that r = k0 + . . . + ki2ib + ki+12(i+1)b +
. . . kl−12(l−1)b, where ki is the number of votes for choice
i. Taking r mod 2b(i+1) gives k0 + . . .+ ki2ib. Dividing
by 2ib produces k0/2ib+. . .+ki, whose ﬂoor is simply ki.
The special case of i = l − 1 is easy to see. This method
works as long each choice gets less than 2b votes, where b
equals s/l as described previously. Hence, b = s/l should
be chosen such that 2b < n, which is easy to guarantee
with typical values of s.
E. Analysis of SPP-Computation
During an execution of the SPP-Computation protocol,
the messages need to be long enough to encode all the
possible outcomes of the polling. In particular, if the poll is
among  choices, the message need to have at least  log n
bits. The following lemmas summarize the main properties
of SPP-Computation protocol in terms of communication
cost (i.e. number of messages sent by the honest nodes,
messages that all are of identical size).
Lemma 1 (Communication cost). SPP-Computation has
a global communication cost of O(n log3 n). Furthermore,
it is (Poly(log n),Poly(log n))-balanced, in the sense
that no node sends or receives more than Poly(log n)
bits of information, with an average of O(log3 n) bits of
information per node.
Proof: During the setup of the threshold cryptosys-
tem and the threshold decryption, only one cluster is
involved and the communication cost of the primitives
used (threshold cryptosystem setup, secure broadcast, and
threshold decryption) is polynomial in the size of the
cluster, which corresponds to a communication complexity
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of O(Poly(log n)). During the local aggregation, in each
cluster, each node broadcasts its encrypted input and a
broadcast induces a communication cost of O(log3 n).
As there are O(n/ log n) clusters with O(log n) nodes
in each cluster, it results in a communication cost of
O(n log3 n). Finally, the inter-cluster communication re-
quires that all the n nodes send O(log n) messages, each of
size O(log n), to the nodes of the parent cluster, resulting
in a communication cost of O(n log2 n). As a result, the
protocol is dominated by the local aggregation part, which
leads to a global communication cost of O(n log3 n).
Moreover, it is easy to see from the description of the
protocol that it is balanced in the sense that it requires
O(Poly(log n)) communications from each node.
Furthermore, SPP-Computation is near-optimal as its
complexity is O(n log3 n) compared to the lower bound
of Ω(n log n).
Lemma 2 (Security). SPP-Computation ensures perfect
security against a computationally-bounded adversary
controlling up to ( 12−)n Byzantine nodes for any constant
1
2 >  > 0 (not depending on n) and outputs the exact
value of the polling with high probability.
Proof: The privacy of the inputs of individual nodes is
protected by the use of a cryptosystem that is semantically
secure and also by the fact that the adversary cannot
decrypt the partial aggregate because it does not know the
necessary t secret keys of the threshold cryptosystem to do
so. The correctness is ensured by a combination of several
techniques. First, the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
that each node issues along with the encrypted version
of its value guarantees that the Byzantine nodes cannot
cheat by choosing their values outside the range of the
possible ones. Second, the secure broadcast ensures that
honest nodes in each cluster have the same local aggregate.
Third, the fact that the majority decision rule is used every
time the nodes of a cluster communicate with the nodes of
the next cluster along with the fact that there is a majority
of honest nodes in each cluster (due to the construction
of the structured overlay) ensures that the correctness of
the partial aggregate will be preserved during the whole
computation. Finally, the non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof of the validity of the partial shares during the
threshold decryption prevent the Byzantine nodes from
altering the output during the last step of the protocol.
V. APPLICATIONS OF SPP
In this section, we outline how to adapt SPP to obtain
SPP-BA, an optimal Byzantine Agreement protocol. Note
that the guarantees provided by SPP-Computation are
stronger that what is really needed for a BA protocol, as
it also protect the privacy of inputs of the nodes.
A. Optimal Byzantine Agreement
We ﬁrst run the protocol SPP-Overlay in order to
construct a partition of the nodes into clusters of size
O(log n) organized in a binary tree, each containing a
majority of honest nodes. Afterwards, the protocol SPP-
BA goes as follows:
1) The nodes from C0 execute a Byzantine Agreement
protocol (such as [41]) among themselves and agree on a
common bit b.
2) Each node from cluster C0 sends b to all the nodes of
C1 and C2 according to the binary tree structure.
3) A node from cluster Ci receiving b from the nodes of
its parent cluster uses a majority rule to select the correct
value of b and forwards it to all the nodes of its cluster’s
children (step 3 is repeated cluster by cluster following
the binary tree structure until the leaves are reached).
We now analyze the communication cost of this pro-
tocol. Step 1 has a communication cost of O(log3/2 n)
as |C1| = O(log n). Step 2, as well as each run of
Step 3, has a communication cost of O(log2 n). Therefore,
as there are O(n/ log n) clusters involved, this results in
a global communication cost of O(n log n) for SPP-BA,
which matches the lower bound of Theorem 1. Moreover,
this protocol is (k, k)-balanced for some constant k and
has a round complexity of O(log n) rounds.
B. Secure Multiparty Aggregation
In [10], King and Saia ask whether or not it is possible
to perform secure multiparty computation using o(n2) bits
of communication. For the speciﬁc case of functions com-
puting a linear combination of inputs, SPP-Computation
enables us to answer positively to this question. Indeed, it
is possible to run the initialization phase of SPP-Overlay,
which constructs the overlay from scratch, in the presence
of Byzantine nodes, for a communication cost of O˜(n3/2),
as shown in Section IV-C . Moreover, as SPP-Computation
can be easily extended to compute any linear combinations
of the inputs of nodes (cf. Section IV-D), this gives us the
claimed result.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the practical performances
of (1) SPP-Computation, for a binary poll, which we com-
pare against a protocol based on unstructured networks and
(2) SPP-BA, our optimal Byzantine agreement protocol
based on SPP. More precisely, we will evaluate and com-
pare these protocols by measuring their communication
and computational costs. The experiments were conducted
on the Emulab platform [12], a distributed testbed allowing
the user to choose a speciﬁc network topology using NS2
conﬁguration ﬁle. In each experiment, we use up to 80
PC3000 machines, which correspond to Dell PowerEdge
2850s systems with a single 3 GHz Xeon processor, 2
GB of RAM, and 4 available network interfaces. Each
machine runs Fedora 8 as its operating system and hosts
10 nodes at the same time. The nodes are connected to the
router in a star topology, setting the maximum network
bandwidth to 1000Mb, and the communication relies on
UDP. We use a reliable broadcast protocol of [42] and the
“Paillier Threshold Encryption Toolbox” [43] for threshold
encryption. The nodes adjust their message sending rate
to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 2 seconds. For
each network size, we do ﬁve experimental runs, where
each run involves a signiﬁcant number of nodes over which
the metrics are averaged. We use 95% conﬁdence intervals,
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displayed on all the ﬁgures. Due to the large number of
nodes on which the averages are obtained, the intervals
are very narrow and almost unnoticeable.
We perform the comparisons with the non-layout based
protocol (NL) (i.e. that of unstructured networks), in which
each node 1) securely broadcasts its encrypted input to all
other nodes, 2) combines the values it receives, 3) securely
broadcasts its decryption share to the others, and 4) com-
bines the decryption shares to obtain the ﬁnal output. Such
a protocol provides privacy and correctness with certainty
against an honest majority but requires a communication
cost O(n3). Therefore, even for medium sized networks
(e.g., 200 to 800 nodes), the communication cost of the
protocol is signiﬁcant with hundreds of millions of mes-
sages being exchanged. In order to compare this protocol
to ours, we quantify the complexity of single instances of
a secure broadcast. Since the broadcast runs are assumed
to be run sequentially to avoid congestion, we can add
up the cost of each. For ease of implementation, we use a
centralized key generation authority to set up the threshold
version of the Paillier’s cryptosystem, whose modulus is
ﬁxed to 1024 bits. Moreover, we set the cluster size to be
20 ∗ log n, which we found empirically to be adequate for
an adversary controlling a fraction of 310 nodes.
1) Communication Cost: This cost is quantiﬁed by the
total number of megabytes sent during the execution of
the protocol. Figure 3.a depicts the global communication
cost using a semi-log scale, with a varying network size.
We observe that the polling function SPP-Computation is
much more efﬁcient than NL in terms of communication
cost. For instance, in a network composed of 200 nodes,
NL has a global communication cost of approximately
30GB whereas SPP-Computation communication cost is
approximately 4GB. Figure 3.b further details the commu-
nication cost per node. While it keeps increasing with NL,
SPP-Computation generates a lower cost per node which
is almost independent of the network size. Moreover,
the cost of the Byzantine Agreement protocol (SPP-BA)
is signiﬁcantly lower than the one of SPP-Computation
because most broadcasts are avoided in SPP-BA.
2) Computational Cost: In this experiment, for each
size of the network, we average over all the nodes the com-
putational cost of the steps in SPP-Computation. Figure 3.c
illustrates the breakdown in terms of computational time.
For each network size (i.e., 200, 400, 600 and 800 nodes),
the durations of the different steps for SPP-Computation
can be seen on the left while those of NL are on the
right. We plot the durations of the vote encryption, share
computation, and vote decryption (i.e., share combination).
This ﬁgure highlights the efﬁciency of our protocol and
indicates that decryption is the most expensive step in both
protocols, thus supporting our approach of delegating this
task to clusters of small size.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed SPP, a scalable and
secure distributed protocol to conduct polls in a dynamic
network. Its complexity is drastically lower than those of
previously known algorithms and within a factor log2 n
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Fig. 3. Experimental evaluation of our protocol (SPP) and of the
Byzantine Agreement protocol (BA) against a non-layout based one
(NL).
of the optimal. The experimental evaluation illustrates
that SPP-Computation signiﬁcantly outperforms classical
protocols in unstructured networks. Furthermore, the im-
plementation shows that the proposed solution is efﬁcient
whereas protocols in unstructured networks cannot be used
in practice in large networks due to scalability issues.
We have also presented two applications of SPP: (1)
an optimal Byzantine agreement protocol for dynamic
networks as well as (2) a protocol for computing functions
consisting in linear combination of inputs whose com-
plexity is O˜(n3/2). We leave as future work the design
of a protocol closing the gap between the lower bound
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of Ω(n log n) and the upper bound O(n log3 n) currently
achieved by SPP as well as the possibility of extending
our algorithms to other secure multiparty computations.
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